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Abstract—Adversarial examples are known to have a negative 
effect on the performance of classifiers which have otherwise good 
performance on undisturbed images. These examples are 
generated by adding non-random noise to the testing samples in 
order to make classifier misclassify the given data. Adversarial 
attacks use these intentionally generated examples and they pose a 
security risk to the machine learning based systems. To be immune 
to such attacks, it is desirable to have a pre-processing mechanism 
which removes these effects causing misclassification while 
keeping the content of the image. JPEG and JPEG2000 are well 
known image compression techniques which suppress the high-
frequency content taking the human visual system into account.  
JPEG has been also shown to be an effective method in reducing 
adversarial noise. In this paper, we propose applying JPEG2000 
compression as an alternative and systematically compare the 
classification performance of adversarial images compressed 
using JPEG and JPEG2000 at different target PSNR values and 
maximum compression levels. Our experiments show that 
JPEG2000 is more effective in reducing adversarial noise as it 
allows higher compression rates with less distortion and it does not 
introduce blocking artifacts.  
Keywords — image classification; adversarial examples; image 
compression, JPEG2000 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Image classification has several practical applications and 
has been a major interest area for computer vision researchers. 
Proving their success in ImageNet competitions, deep learning 
methods have now become the de-facto tools in solving image 
classification problems. However, recent studies have shown 
that these methods are vulnerable to malicious attacks. 
Researchers have revealed that the classifiers could be fooled to 
misclassify a given image by introducing specially crafted noise 
to the data (adversarial examples) [1]. Adversarial images 
having perturbed data points have been shown to make high-
performing image classifiers such as Inception [2] misclassify 
with great confidence. These adversarial examples then have 
been replicated in further studies [3] [4] [5] [6] and new methods 
of creating adversarial examples were proposed [5] [7] [8] [9]. 
As a general principle, adversarial examples are generated by 
adding non-random noise into the image. The amount of this 
noise is small enough to be almost imperceptible to human eye. 
Example adversarial images, generated using the method in [5], 
are given in Figure 1. 
Making the classifiers robust to these adversarial examples 
is a hot topic of research in the field of image classification. 
“Defense against Adversarial Attacks” challenge was held in the 
conference Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 
2017 (NIPS 2017) [10]. The proposed defense mechanisms 
against adversarial attacks include defensive distillation [11], 
denoising autoencoders [12], compression based approaches 
[13] and retraining the networks with adversarial examples. It 
has been shown that JPEG compressing an adversarial image 
before feeding it to the classification network works as a defense 
[13] and the classification performance of the OverFeat network 
improves with the usage of a compression layer.  
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Figure 1 a) Original image and adversarial images with various ε 
values: b) ε = 5, c) ε = 10, d) ε = 20 
JPEG is essentially a lossy image compression algorithm 
exploiting coding redundancy, inter-pixel redundancy and 
psycho-visual redundancy. Coding redundancy is based on the 
observation that some pixels are more common; Huffman 
coding assigns shorter bits strings to more frequent symbols. 
Inter-pixel redundancy occurs due to the similarity of 
neighboring pixels; run-length coding (RLC) exploits this 
observation and RLC is utilized for a more efficient 
representation of pixel values. JPEG is a transform based 
compression algorithm where Discrete Cosine Transform 
(DCT) is used to transform image blocks into their frequency 
components. The image is first subdivided into 8x8 blocks and 
each block is DCT transformed separately. After the transform, 
the coefficients in the block are quantized using 8x8 quantization 
tables. The quantization table uses the fact that the coefficients 
represent increasing frequencies when they are traversed in a 
zig-zag order. Psycho-visual redundancy is exploited by 
penalizing the higher frequency coefficients more as human 
visual system is less sensitive to these components.  A reflection 
on these steps reveals that the only step removing any 
information from the image (disregarding the color space 
conversion) is the quantization part which suppresses the higher 
frequencies. While useful as an adversarial defense mechanism, 
JPEG has two major disadvantages in this context: (i) it works 
by transforming and quantizing 8x8 blocks individually, which 
inevitably results in blocking artifacts (Figure 2). As these 
artifacts occur at the same locations for each image, it is 
expected to reduce the classification performance. (ii) JPEG is 
not designed for high-compression rates and the image is 
distorted significantly at high rates, adversely affecting the 
classification performance.  
 JPEG2000 compression, which is based on wavelet 
transform, was developed to alleviate the shortcomings of JPEG. 
Wavelet coding typically produces more efficient compression 
than DCT based methods. In addition, it does not introduce any 
blocking artifacts as there is no need to subdivide the image 
before transformation.  Embedded Block Coding with 
Optimized Truncation (EBCOT) produces a stream having 
quality and resolution scalability. 
It has recently been shown that JPEG compression is 
effective against adversarial attacks and classification accuracy 
on adversarial images is recovered when compression is 
increased. However the accuracy drops when quantization 
becomes too aggressive [14]. On the other hand, JPEG2000 
could achieve higher compression rates with less distortion (i.e. 
lower mean square error at the same file size) and does not 
introduce blocking artifacts. These properties are expected to 
lead to a better performance while removing the adversarial 
noise.    
In this study, we propose using JPEG2000 as an alternative 
and systematically examine the effects of JPEG and JPEG2000 
compressing adversarial images before the classification and 
compare their performance.  
II. METHOD 
There are two main types of adversarial attacks: Targeted 
attacks and Non-Targeted attacks. Targeted attacks are types of 
attacks that pre-determine the target incorrect class for each 
image. For instance, if the aim is to make the classifier 
incorrectly classify a cat image as a dog image, the target would 
be the “dog” class. Some examples for targeted attacks are 
Momentum Iterative Attack [15], Saliency Map Method [16] 
and Carlini-Wagner attack [4]. Non-targeted attacks are types of 
attacks which do not explicitly specify the target outcome. In 
both cases, the maximum amount of noise that can be added to 
image is determined using an epsilon value. In this work, we 
used non-targeted attacks to test our ideas. 
To test the efficacy of JPEG and JPEG2000 compression, we 
added adversarial noise to images in [17] using the Fast Gradient 
Sign (FGSM) method introduced in [5] as well as Basic Iterative 
Method introduced in [8]. In the experiments, we used Inception 
v3 classifier [2] and the widely known ImageNet Dataset [17]. 
As we have used pre-trained models, we accessed only the test 
set to perform classification. The test set has 1000 annotated 
images. 
FGSM attack applies noise linearly based on the gradient of 
the objective function while BIM attacks applies FGSM with 
small increments. 
The attacks were applied with varying ε values. ε values 
determine the maximum amount of adversarial noise that can be 
added to the image to fool the classifier. In our case, we used 5, 
10 and 20 for FGSM attack while we kept the ε value constant 
at 15 for BIM attack. The ε for BIM attack was kept constant 
because BIM attack takes longer to run due to its iterative nature. 
These values are also coherent with the study that we are 
elaborating on [13]. 
Adversarial images were compressed using JPEG and 
JPEG2000 with different settings. To test the performance of 
both compression schemes, JPEG and JPEG2000 compression 
were applied to the images in a fashion that the resulting image 
would have a target PSNR value. For completeness, we tested 
with various PSNR values and reported the results in Section III. 
The PSNR values used for the compression are 23, 25, 28 and 
31 dB. These values are chosen arbitrarily by visually judging 
the image quality. The sample images for these compression 
values are given in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – JPEG Compressed Images at Different Quality Levels. 
Blocking artifacts can be observed with increasing compression rate:   
a) 23 dB PSNR b) 25 dB PSNR c) 28 dB PSNR d) 31 dB PSNR  
PSNR based compression is inherent in JPEG2000 due to the 
EBCOT process, however it is not inherent to JPEG 
compression. In order to achieve comparable PSNR to preset 
values, JPEG compression was applied iteratively until the 
resulting image’s PSNR is within 0.01 difference to the target 
value. 
To further explore the limits of these two compression 
schemes, we reduced the images to the smallest possible size that 
our tools allowed us to. This case is aimed to study the change 
in performance when maximum amount of suppression was 
applied. The smallest possible size for JPEG2000 was found to 
be around 5 KB, but for JPEG compression this value varied 
significantly ranging from 9 KBs to 11.5 KBs for different noise 
levels. 
III. RESULTS 
To assess the classification performance, the test set of 
ImageNet is used. This test set contains 1000 images previously 
not seen by the classifier. The accuracy of the classifier is 
reported for each different case along with the accuracy for 
uncompressed adversarial examples. 
Accuracy values for PSNR based analysis can be found in 
Table I. The columns refer to the attacks along with the ε value 
used for the attack. The rows refer to different compression 
settings and PSNR values are calculated using the original 
uncompressed adversarial image. The accuracy for the original 
adversarial attack image is given in the last row. The highest 
accuracy values for each column are given in bold. 
Table 1 Accuracy results for images compressed at different PSNR 
values 
 PSNR 
(dB) 
FGSM 
(ε =20) 
FGSM 
(ε =10) 
FGSM  
(ε =5) 
BIM 
(ε =15) 
JPEG 
23 0.361 0.415 0.379 0.393 
25 0.317 0.457 0.499 0.452 
28 0.283 0.319 0.502 0.229 
31 0.283 0.260 0.369 0.031 
JPEG2000 
23 0.339 0.473 0.513 0.461 
25 0.337 0.436 0.577 0.429 
28 0.283 0.346 0.490 0.164 
31 0.281 0.265 0.378 0.045 
Uncompressed NA 0.266 0.244 0.221 0.016 
 
Accuracy values for maximum compression are given in Table 
2. As the images are compressed to their minimum size, there is 
no PSNR setting for this case.  
Table 2 Accuracy results at maximum compression levels 
 
FGSM 
(ε =20) 
FGSM 
(ε =10) 
FGSM 
(ε =5) 
BIM 
(ε =15) 
JPEG2000 0.428 0.523 0.634 0.511 
JPEG 0.378 0.400 0.475 0.229 
Uncompressed 0.266 0.244 0.221 0.016 
 
 
Figure 3 Accuracy for JPEG for different PSNR values 
 
 
Figure 4 Accuracy for JPEG2000 for different PSNR values 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to explore the effectiveness of 
using compression algorithms for pre-processing before feeding 
these images to the classifiers. The classification results were 
improved by a significant margin using this approach which 
suggests that suppressing high-frequency content is an effective 
defense mechanism against adversarial attacks. We used the 
compression algorithms as a whole to test this idea in line with 
the previous works [13] and we changed the compression levels 
to observe its effects. However, it is evident that using only the 
transformation and quantization parts should be sufficient and 
computationally more efficient to achieve similar results. 
JPEG compression uses 8x8 filter windows and as a result 
adds artificial block borders to the compressed image (Figure 5). 
As the block partitioning is fixed, the blocking artifacts occur at 
the same pixel positions for each image. This is expected to 
make images more similar at these borders and reduce the 
classification performance. While the classification performance 
of JPEG2000 compression is noticeably better than JPEG in case 
of maximum compression, this cannot be claimed for PSNR 
based analysis where JPEG compression outperforms 
JPEG2000 compression.  
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We have observed the best performance when the images are 
compressed to minimum possible size. There was a significant 
range in image sizes and adversarial noise reduction when we 
used PSNR based compression. This lead us to think, adding 
adversarial noise to images, and then applying PSNR based 
compression sometimes fails to compress the image enough to 
reduce high-frequency noise as it tries to preserve adversarial 
noise as well. So, maximum compression performs better as it 
suppresses the higher-frequency components more. 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5 a) JPEG compressed b) JPEG 2000 compressed image 
V. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we explored the potential of JPEG2000 
compression as defense against adversarial examples and 
compared its performance with JPEG. The results show that 
while both increase the classification accuracy of adversarial 
images and work effectively against Fast Gradient Sign Method 
and Basic Iterative Method, JPEG2000 performs better and 
outperform JPEG especially higher compression rates. A closer 
look into the workings of these compression methods reveals 
that suppression of high-frequency content is the main factor for 
the performance gain. In the future, we are planning to use 
transformations (DCT and wavelet) followed by quantization as 
preprocessing steps instead of using the whole compression 
algorithm as a black box. This will also enable a more controlled 
use of different quantization matrices and by representing the 
quantization matrix parametrically would also allow learning 
these parameters for a particular defense. 
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